RFC 1824 (rfc1824) - Page 1 of 21


The Exponential Security System TESS: An Identity-Based Cryptographic Protocol for Authenticated Key-Exchange (E



Alternative Format: Original Text Document



Network Working Group                                         H. Danisch
Request for Comments: 1824                                 E.I.S.S./IAKS
Category: Informational                                      August 1995


                 The Exponential Security System TESS:
                An Identity-Based Cryptographic Protocol
                     for Authenticated Key-Exchange
                        (E.I.S.S.-Report 1995/4)

Status of this Memo

   This memo provides information for the Internet community.  This memo
   does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of
   this memo is unlimited.

Abstract

   This informational RFC describes the basic mechanisms  and  functions
   of  an identity based system for the secure authenticated exchange of
   cryptographic keys, the generation of signatures, and  the  authentic
   distribution of public keys.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction and preliminary remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
       1.1.  Definition of terms/Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
       1.2.  Required mechanisms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Setup  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       2.1.  SKIA Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       2.2.  User Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       3.1.  Zero Knowledge Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       3.2.  Unilateral Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       3.3.  Mutual Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.4.  Message Signing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   4.  Enhancements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       4.1.  Non-Escrowed Key Generation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       4.2.  Hardware Protected Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       4.3.  Key Regeneration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       4.4.  r ^ r  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       4.5.  Implicit Key Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       4.6.  Law Enforcement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       4.7.  Usage of other Algebraic Groups  . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
             4.7.1  DSA subgroup SKIA Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
             4.7.2  Escrowed DSA subgroup User Setup  . . . . . . . . 14
             4.7.3  Non-Escrowed DSA subgroup User Setup  . . . . . . 15
             4.7.4  DSA subgroup Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . 15



Danisch                      Informational