RFC 3097 (rfc3097) - Page 2 of 4
RSVP Cryptographic Authentication -- Updated Message Type Value
Alternative Format: Original Text Document
RFC 3097 RSVP Cryptographic Authentication April 2001
2. Modification
Message Types defined in the RSVP Integrity extension [RFC 2747]
shall be changed as follows:
o Challenge message has Message Type 25.
o Integrity Response message has Message Type 25+1.
3. Compatibility
Two communicating nodes whose Integrity implementations are
conformant with this modification will interoperate, using Message
Type 12 for Bundle messages and Message Types 25 and 26 for the
Integrity handshake. A non-conformant implementation of the
Integrity extension will not interoperate with a conformant
implementation (though two non-conformant implementations can
interoperate as before).
There is no possibility of an Integrity handshake succeeding
accidentally due to this change, since both sides of the handshake
use the new numbers or the old numbers. Furthermore, the Integrity
Response message includes a 32-bit cookie that must match a cookie in
the Challenge message, else the challenge will fail. Finally, a
non-conformant implementation should never receive a Bundle message
that it interprets as an Integrity Response message, since RFC 2961
requires that Bundle messages be sent only to a Bundle-capable node.
4. References
[RFC 2747] Baker, F., Lindell, R. and M. Talwar, "RSVP Cryptographic
Authentication", RFC 2747, January 2000.
[RFC 2961] Berger, L., Gan, D., Swallow, G., Pan, P., Tommasi, F.
and S. Molendini, "RSVP Refresh Overhead Reduction
Extensions", RFC 2961, April 2001.
Security Considerations
No new security considerations are introduced beyond RFC 2747 itself
and the compatibility issues above.
Braden & Zhang Standards Track