RFC 3183 (rfc3183) - Page 1 of 24

Domain Security Services using S/MIME

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Network Working Group                                            T. Dean
Request for Comments: 3183                                    W. Ottaway
Category: Experimental                                           QinetiQ
                                                            October 2001


                 Domain Security Services using S/MIME

Status of this Memo

   This memo defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet
   community.  It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.
   Discussion and suggestions for improvement are requested.
   Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   This document describes how the S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose Internet
   Mail Extensions) protocol can be processed and generated by a number
   of components of a communication system, such as message transfer
   agents, guards and gateways to deliver security services.  These
   services are collectively referred to as 'Domain Security Services'.

Acknowledgements

   Significant comments were made by Luis Barriga, Greg Colla, Trevor
   Freeman, Russ Housley, Dave Kemp, Jim Schaad and Michael Zolotarev.

1. Introduction

   The S/MIME [1] series of standards define a data encapsulation format
   for the provision of a number of security services including data
   integrity, confidentiality, and authentication.  S/MIME is designed
   for use by messaging clients to deliver security services to
   distributed messaging applications.

   The mechanisms described in this document are designed to solve a
   number of interoperability problems and technical limitations that
   arise when different security domains wish to communicate securely,
   for example when two domains use incompatible messaging technologies
   such as the X.400 series and SMTP/MIME, or when a single domain
   wishes to communicate securely with one of its members residing on an
   untrusted domain.  The scenarios covered by this document are
   domain-to-domain, individual-to-domain and domain-to-individual



Dean & Ottaway                Experimental
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